Archive for September, 2007


Report reveals horror of ‘honor-killing’

Monday, September 24th, 2007

ISTANBUL – Turkish Daily News
Her father raped her and her mother learned of it when she was five-month pregnant. The verdict from the family: Death.

Her husband thought she was impregnated by another man. Verdict from the family: Death.

A husband cut his wife’s throat, but luckily, she survived.

She left her husband, whom she was forced to marry. She had fallen in love with another man. Verdict from the family: Death.

In the past four years, a total of 158 women from eastern and southeastern Anatolia applied to the Women’s Center (KA-MER) stating they are threatened with honor-killings, three of who could not be rescued and died. Twenty-three among these women were forced to commit suicide to execute the verdict, showing a relationship between the number of suicides and so-called �honor killings,� said KA-MER in a report titled �We Can Stop It.�

KA-MER, founded in the eastern Anatolian city of Diyarbakır in 2003, has worked on the issues of violence and honor killings in the east and southeast Anatolian regions.

Twenty-three women faced verdicts of death simply because they met with or escaped with the men they love, according to the report. The number of raped or harassed who �had to die� was 19.

Of the cases of women sentenced to death, 27 were discovered to be �unfounded aspersions.�

Various motives:

  Though there are various reasons behind honor killings, disobedience was found to be the reason behind most cases with 37 women, or 23.4 percent. Disobedience was defined in numerous ways: refusing to marry the person the family had chosen, refusing to have sex with a brother-in-law or father, not accepting prostitution, not fulfilling the demands of the husbands, fathers, brothers or other elders or complaining about husbands raping their daughters or interrupting man-to-man conversations.

The death verdicts mainly come from the family of the victim, the report shows. In the cases of 56 women, their families decided that they should die. The father has the most clout in the verdict, and 37 of the fathers decided on death. The second decision-maker is the husband, 55 of who sentenced their wives to death.

A majority of the decision makers have no education, the report shows. While 65 of them are illiterate, 42 know how to read and write yet had no formal school education. It is observed that as the level of education increases, the rate of death verdicts decrease.

Light at the end of the tunnel:

  The fact that honor killings still exist in Turkey makes it necessary for urgent measures to be taken. �The responsibility to solve the problem, which will disappear when the level of education increases along with economic development, rests with all citizens and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as with public institutions and organizations,� said Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in a circular issued last summer.

The report is the fourth and last study by KA-MER on the issue. It �is a clear evidence of a revolutionary stance on the problem,� said Aysun Sayın, the secretary-general of the Association to Support Female Candidates (KA-DER), drawing attention to how the issue has become �visible� to the public.

KA-MER’s report �showed the right way for a solution,� she continued. �If the government sincerely wants to solve the problem, it can broaden this work. Women, through various organizations, are doing everything they can. But the government has to help them.�

With such reports, a permanent solution to the problem becomes easier, says Sayın. The government now should provide the budget, the human resource and �allow the mechanism to stop honor-killings start,� she emphasized.

Sociologist Pınar Selek, added that the issue is becoming crucial �in a good way, in a way to solve it, to change the fate of women by women themselves.�

The KA-MER report also included an optimistic end-note, announcing that �all women who applied for help from the organization in 2007� are still alive.

A Dishonorable Affair

Sunday, September 23rd, 2007

The struggle, if there was any, would have been very brief.

Fawaz later recalled that his wife, Zahra, was sleeping soundly on her side and curled slightly against the pillow when he rose at dawn and readied himself for work at his construction job on the outskirts of Damascus. It was a rainy Sunday morning in January and very cold; as he left, Fawaz turned back one last time to tuck the blanket more snugly around his 16-year-old wife. Zahra slept on without stirring, and her husband locked the door of their tiny apartment carefully behind him.

Zahra was most likely still sleeping when her older brother, Fayyez, entered the apartment a short time later, using a stolen key and carrying a dagger. His sister lay on the carpeted floor, on the thin, foam mattress she shared with her husband, so Fayyez must have had to kneel next to Zahra as he raised the dagger and stabbed her five times in the head and back: brutal, tearing thrusts that shattered the base of her skull and nearly severed her spinal column. Leaving the door open, Fayyez walked downstairs and out to the local police station. There, he reportedly turned himself in, telling the officers on duty that he had killed his sister in order to remove the dishonor she had brought on the family by losing her virginity out of wedlock nearly 10 months earlier.

“Fayyez told the police, ‘It is my right to correct this error,’ ” Maha Ali, a Syrian lawyer who knew Zahra and now works pro bono for her husband, told me not long ago. “He said, ‘It’s true that my sister is married now, but we never washed away the shame.’ ”

By now, almost anyone in Syria who follows the news can supply certain basic details about Zahra al-Azzo’s life and death: how the girl, then only 15, was kidnapped in the spring of 2006 near her home in northern Syria, taken to Damascus by her abductor and raped; how the police who discovered her feared that her family, as commonly happens in Syria, would blame Zahra for the rape and kill her; how these authorities then placed Zahra in a prison for girls, believing it the only way to protect her from her relatives. And then in December, how a cousin of Zahra’s, 27-year-old Fawaz, agreed to marry her in order to secure her release and also, he hoped, restore her reputation in the eyes of her family; how, just a month after her wedding to Fawaz, Zahra’s 25-year-old brother, Fayyez, stabbed her as she slept.

Zahra died from her wounds at the hospital the following morning, one of about 300 girls and women who die each year in Syria in so-called honor killings, according to estimates by women’s rights advocates there. In Syria and other Arab countries, many men are brought up to believe in an idea of personal honor that regards defending the chastity of their sisters, their daughters and other women in the family as a primary social obligation. Honor crimes tend to occur, activists say, when men feel pressed by their communities to demonstrate that they are sufficiently protective of their female relatives’ virtue. Pairs of lovers are sometimes killed together, but most frequently only the women are singled out for punishment. Sometimes women are killed for the mere suspicion of an affair, or on account of a false accusation, or because they were sexually abused, or because, like Zahra, they were raped.

In speaking with the police, Zahra’s brother used a colloquial expression, ghasalat al arr (washing away the shame), which means the killing of a woman or girl whose very life has come to be seen as an unbearable stain on the honor of her male relatives. Once this kind of familial sexual shame has been “washed,” the killing is traditionally forgotten as quickly as possible. Under Syrian law, an honor killing is not murder, and the man who commits it is not a murderer. As in many other Arab countries, even if the killer is convicted on the lesser charge of a “crime of honor,” he is usually set free within months. Mentioning the killing — or even the name of the victim — generally becomes taboo.

That this has not happened with Zahra’s story — that her case, far from being ignored, has become something of a cause célèbre, a rallying point for lawyers, Islamic scholars and Syrian officials hoping to change the laws that protect the perpetrators of honor crimes — is a result of a peculiar confluence of circumstances. It is due in part to the efforts of a group of women’s rights activists and in part to the specifics of her story, which has galvanized public sympathy in a way previously unseen in Syria. But at heart it is because of Zahra’s young widower, Fawaz, who had spoken to his bride only once before they became engaged. Now, defying his tribe and their traditions, he has brought a civil lawsuit against Zahra’s killer and is refusing to let her case be forgotten.

Nashweh, where Zahra al-Azzo was born in 1990, is the sort of Syrian town that seems literally to crumble at its edges — its squat cinder-block houses giving way to heaps of decaying construction materials, then to stubbly wheat fields strewn with garbage. The quantities of laundry drying on wires strung above the houses suggest vast extended families. Nashweh is small enough and remote enough that if a stranger steps out of a car, it is a matter of seconds before a troupe of small boys wearing dirty galabias circles round and begins shouting invitations home for tea. Before last year Zahra had spent her entire life there, but recently, when asked if they had known her, a half-dozen town women — uniformly dressed in head scarves and thin velour house dresses, most over 40 with blue Bedouin facial tattoos — simply looked away.

By local standards, the circumstances of Zahra’s life in Nashweh were perfectly ordinary. In her early childhood the family earned a good living raising Arabian horses, but the Azzos had lately fallen on hard times, and Zahra’s father, according to social workers who talked to Zahra in prison, was rumored to be having an affair.

According to the lawyer Maha Ali, who met Zahra in prison, Zahra first heard the rumors from a friend of her father’s. The man threatened Zahra, telling her that he would reveal the scandal if she didn’t join him outside her house, itself a grave transgression in her conservative society. That Zahra did so, disobeying her family and going out with a man unaccompanied, even under duress, is so scandalous to many Syrians that advocates working on Zahra’s case have tried to obscure this fact, preferring to describe what took place as a simple kidnapping. They also say that at 15 she was naïve in the extreme, so young for her age that she took a teddy bear to bed every night in prison.

Zahra was frightened by the man but apparently believed that if she came out with him, briefly, she could ensure her family’s reputation and safety. Instead, says Yumin Abu al-Hosn, a social worker at the prison, she was taken to Damascus, held in an apartment and raped. Terrified, in a strange and crowded city she had never visited, Zahra didn’t try to run away. She was in the capital with the man for about a week when a tip from a neighbor took the police to the door. The man was taken to jail, where he now awaits trial for kidnapping and rape. Zahra, meanwhile, was taken to a police station for a so-called virginity exam, the hymen examination that, however unreliable at establishing virginity, is standard procedure in Syria in rape cases and common when women are taken into police custody.

In the United States, a whitewashed, heavily guarded building like the one where Zahra was then sent for her protection would probably be called a juvenile-detention center, but Arabic offers no such euphemism, so the words for “prison” or “institution” are used. Syria does not have shelters where girls or women can go if they are threatened with honor killing; instead, minors are often placed in girls’ prisons for their protection. Like many of the teenagers who arrive there, Zahra felt humiliated at having gone through the forcible genital examination and tried at first for a show of defiance, according to Maha Ali. “I came in and met Zahra,” Ali said. “And she just looked at me and said, ‘God, do I have to tell the story all over again?’ ”

For girls like Zahra, prison is only a temporary solution. Even the most murderously inclined families often issue emotional court appeals to have their daughters returned to them. Judges usually try to extract sworn statements from male guardians, promises that the girls, if released, will not be harmed. But those promises are often broken.

Among Syria’s so-called tribal families — settled Bedouin clans like the one that Zahra belonged to — first-cousin marriage is common. So it wasn’t a shock when her family, looking for someone who could marry her while she was in prison and help secure her release, turned to one of her cousins, Fawaz. But Fawaz hadn’t intended to marry a cousin, he told me recently, and was startled when Zahra’s brother Fayyez showed up one day at his home.

“Fayyez started telling us that his sister, Zahra, had been kidnapped,” said Fawaz’s mother, who is usually addressed by the honorific Umm Fawaz, meaning “mother of Fawaz.” She was sitting cross-legged, along with her son and husband, in the front room of the family apartment outside Damascus. The shades were pulled down to keep out the searing late spring heat, and the room was lighted by a single fluorescent tube. Umm Fawaz pointed out the place on the cushions — arranged, Arab-style, on the floor against the walls — where Fayyez had sat.

The mere fact that Zahra had been taken from her home for a few days signaled dishonor for the family. “ ‘Oh, Auntie, I don’t know what to say,’ ” Umm Fawaz recalled Fayyez saying as she adjusted her hijab with one hand and dabbed her eyes with a tissue in the other. “I said: ‘Don’t be ashamed for your sister. Even in the best families, something like this can happen.’ ” Fayyez claimed that despite having been kidnapped, his sister was still a virgin. Slowly, he broached the subject he had come to discuss. Would Fawaz consider marrying Zahra in order to secure her release?

At first, Fawaz, a shy, wiry man, politely demurred. He felt sorry for Fayyez, he told me, but he couldn’t help recoiling a little at the story, which in his community constitutes an ugly sexual scandal. Besides, he was already engaged to another girl. After Fayyez left, though, Fawaz and his mother talked over Zahra’s situation. “We decided to visit the girl, just to see,” Umm Fawaz said. And so several days later the two of them took a taxi to the girls’ prison. They walked past a heavy steel gate, and a guard led them to an office.

Fawaz smiled as he recalled the moment Zahra was brought in. It would be indelicate for him to comment on Zahra’s appearance, so it was Umm Fawaz who talked about Zahra’s beauty (“As lovely as Sibel Can!” she exclaimed, mentioning a Turkish singer popular in the Arab world).

“I liked the girl,” said Fawaz, who seemed embarrassed to have admitted such a personal thing in public, and he quickly corrected himself. “I mean, here we fall in love with a girl after we marry her. But I decided to leave my fiancée for Zahra. I felt that a normal girl like my fiancée would have other chances. With Zahra I thought, my God, she’s such a child to be stuck in this prison.”

Fawaz’s father disapproved, suspecting from the outset that Zahra’s family would kill her once she left prison. But when, months later, Zahra’s family begged the other family to reconsider, Fawaz’s father relented, and Fawaz eventually accompanied Zahra’s father to court to sign her release papers. Zahra and Fawaz were married in a civil ceremony at the prison on Dec. 11, 2006, and then a week later in a formal celebration for the neighborhood, held in the bride’s new home. The few photographs of the wedding were taken with cellphones, so the prints have a blurry, ephemeral quality. In them, Zahra looks stunned and a bit sulky, her hair teased high on her head, her childish features thickly coated with foundation, shocking pink eye shadow and frosted lipstick.

The marriage, by all accounts, was happy. “Zahra used to call me even after her wedding,” Ali, the lawyer, recalled. “ ‘How is Fawaz?’ I’d ask her. And she’d say, ‘Oh, Auntie Maha, we’re spending all night up together, talking and having fun.’ Once, her aunt called me. She said: ‘Don’t tell Zahra I called, but can you talk to her? You have influence on her. Fawaz can’t get up for work because Zahra keeps him up all night.’ ”

Fawaz told me that, according to his interpretation of Islam, he was “honoring Zahra again” — restoring her lost virtue — by marrying her. In this decision he was supported by his sheik, or religious teacher, who according to Fawaz subscribes to a progressive school of Koranic interpretation. Fawaz and his immediate family, though not well educated, are proud of their open-mindedness, and he boasts about Zahra’s intelligence and literacy. Even so, he and the family rebuffed Zahra’s efforts to describe her ordeal to them, so that to this day they know the details only secondhand. “So many times, when we were married, she wanted to talk to me about what had happened to her,” Fawaz said. “But I refused. I told her, ‘Your past is your past.’ ”

According to Fawaz, Zahra had been married just five weeks when her brother, Fayyez, arrived on an unannounced visit, saying he planned to look for work in Damascus. Zahra was happy to see her brother, but Fawaz described feeling painfully torn between his duties to hospitality, a cardinal virtue in Bedouin culture, and his feeling that Fayyez — sleeping just upstairs in Fawaz’s parents’ apartment — was a danger to his wife. On the morning Zahra was attacked, Fawaz recalls going upstairs before leaving for work to find Fayyez awake and tapping nervously at his cellphone.

“He couldn’t afford to have a mobile,” Fawaz said. “I’d been wondering about that. It turned out that his uncle had given him the phone so that he could call and tell the family that he’d killed his sister. We learned later that they had a party that night to celebrate the cleansing of their honor. The whole village was invited.”

Most honor killings receive only brief mention in Syrian newspapers, but Zahra al-Azzo’s death has been unlike any other. Dozens of articles and television programs have discussed her story at length, fueling an unprecedented public conversation about the roots and morality of honor crimes.

In May, hoping to gauge public feeling about Zahra’s case, I spent a couple of hours walking around a crowded lower-middle-class neighborhood in Damascus. In the wealthiest areas of the city, half the people on the streets might be female, but here, in the late evening, there were very few women to be found. In shawarma sandwich shops and juice stalls, most men had heard of Zahra, but more than half of them believed that the practice of honor killing is protected — or outright required — by Islamic law. A man named Abu Rajab, who ran a cigarette stall, described it as “something that is found in religion” and added that even if the laws were changed, “a man will kill his sister if he needs to, even if it means 15 years in prison.”

Yet the notion that Islam condones honor killing is a misconception, according to some lawyers and a few prominent Islamic scholars. Daad Mousa, a Syrian women’s rights advocate and lawyer, told me that though beliefs about cleansing a man’s honor derive from Bedouin tradition, the three Syrian laws used to pardon men who commit honor crimes can be traced back not to Islamic law but to the law codes, based on the Napoleonic code, that were imposed in the Levant during the French mandate. “Article 192 states that if a man commits a crime with an ‘honorable motive,’ he will go free,” Mousa said. “In Western countries this law usually applies in cases where doctors kill their patients accidentally, intending to save them, but here the idea of ‘honorable motive’ is often expanded to include men who are seen as acting in defense of their honor.

“Article 242 refers to crimes of passion,” Mousa continued. “But it’s Article 548 that we’re really up against. Article 548 states precisely that if a man witnesses a female relative in an immoral act and kills her, he will go free.” Judges frequently interpret these laws so loosely that a premeditated killing — like the one Fayyez is accused of — is often judged a “crime of passion”; “witnessing” a female relative’s behavior is sometimes defined as hearing neighborhood gossip about it; and for a woman, merely speaking to a man may be ruled an “immoral act.” Syria, which has been governed since 1963 by a secular Baathist regime, has a strong reputation in the region for sex equality; women graduate from high schools and universities in numbers roughly equal to men, and they frequently hold influential positions as doctors, professors and even government ministers. But in the family, a different standard applies. “Honor here means only one thing: women, and especially the sexual life of women,” Mousa said. The decision to carry out an honor killing is usually made by the family as a group, and an under-age boy is often nominated to carry out the task, to eliminate even the smallest risk of a prison sentence.

Some advocates claim that Syria has an especially high number of honor killings per capita, saying that the country is second or third in the world. In fact, reliable statistics on honor killing are nearly impossible to come by. The United Nations Population Fund says that about 5,000 honor killings take place each year around the world, but since they often occur in rural areas where births and deaths go unreported, it is very difficult to count them by country. Some killings have been recorded in European cultures, including Italy, and in Christian or Druse communities in predominantly Muslim countries. But it is widely agreed that honor killings are found disproportionately in Muslim communities, from Bangladesh to Egypt to Great Britain.

The Grand Mufti Ahmad Badr Eddin Hassoun, Syria’s highest-ranking Islamic teacher, has condemned honor killing and Article 548 in unequivocal terms. Earlier this year, when we met for a rare interview in his spacious office on the 10th floor of Syria’s ministry of religious endowments, he told me, “It happens sometimes that a misogynistic religious scholar will argue that women are the source of all kinds of evil.” In fact, he said, the Koran does not differentiate between women and men in its moral laws, requiring sexual chastity of both, for example. The commonly held view that Article 548 is derived from Islamic law, he said, is false.

With his tightly wound white turban and giant pearl ring, the grand mufti is one of Syria’s most recognizable public figures. He is a charismatic and generally popular sheik, but because he is appointed by the state, many Syrians believe that his views reflect those of the ruling party, and they may find his teachings suspect as a result. In downtown Damascus, one man I interviewed on the street declared that the grand mufti was not a “real Muslim” if he believed in canceling Article 548. “It’s an Islamic law to kill your relative if she errs,” said the man, who gave his name as Ahmed and said that he learned of Zahra’s story on Syrian television. “If the sheik tries to fight this, the people will rise up and slit his throat.”

There are religious figures who defend the status quo. At a conference on honor killing held this year at Damascus University, Mohammed Said Ramadan al-Bouti, one of Syria’s most esteemed clerics, maintained that the laws should not be changed, defending them on the principle in Shariah law that people who kill in defense of their property should be treated with lenience (he is believed to have moderated his stance since). When, at an earlier conference, the grand mufti announced that he didn’t believe protecting a woman’s virginity was the most important component of honor, many attendees were upset. In response, a group of about a dozen women, all dressed in the long black abayas that in Syria are usually worn by only very conservative women, walked out of the room.

In our interview, the grand mufti told me that he believed Article 548 would be struck down by the Syrian Parliament within months, and given his government ties he might be expected to know. Still, women’s rights advocates are not so optimistic. They point out that Syria’s educated elites have long opposed honor killing, though there is often a squeamishness about discussing a practice that is embarrassing to them. They say that some conservative Syrians are having second thoughts about the custom thanks to the efforts of their Islamic teachers, but that their numbers are small.

Bassam al-Kadi, a women’s advocate, told me that Zahra’s case made an ideal rallying point. “We have hundreds of Zahras,” he said. “But there are some stories that you can campaign with, and others that you can’t.” Zahra, in other words — extremely young, a victim of rape, married at the time she was killed — makes a sympathetic figure for a broad Syrian public in a way that, say, someone older who was killed after being seen with her boyfriend in a cafe might not.

With tensions like these in play, Syrian women’s advocates are careful to phrase their criticisms of tribal traditions of honor and Article 548 in Islamic terms. Though some will privately admit that they are secularists, even feminists, they keep it quiet. It would be politically impossible to suggest in public, for example, that women have the right to choose their sexual partners. The basic culture of chastity is in no way being publicly rethought. Some advocates say that their cause is damaged if they are perceived as sympathetic to “Western values,” and even that honor killing is seen by some conservatives as a bulwark against those values. Where 15 years ago Syria banned the import of fax machines and modems, today the Internet is widely accessible. “There’s been a very complicated reaction to the new availability of Western media in this part of the world,” Kadi, the women’s rights advocate, explained. “We’re going through a transition, and our values are changing dramatically.

“Our parents tell us that there was an earlier day when honor meant that you were honorable in your work, that you didn’t take bribes, for example,” Kadi said. “But now, the political and economic situation is so bad that some degree of corruption is necessary to survive. People will say that you’re a good earner for your family; they won’t blame you. Historically speaking, all our other ideologies have collapsed. No one talks about loyalty to country, about professional honor. Now it’s just the family, the tribe, the woman. That’s the only kind of honor we have left.”

Syrian activists say that while many in government would like to see Article 548 changed, the government, which is led by a tiny religious minority, the Alawites, may be afraid to risk offending the more conservative elements of Syria’s Sunni majority. In other parts of the Middle East, too, tensions between ruling elites and religious conservatives have complicated efforts to combat honor killing. Rana Husseini, a Jordanian women’s advocate, told me that though an effort to establish harsher punishments for men who kill female relatives received support from members of the royal family, Jordan’s Parliament rejected the law in 2003 after conservative groups opposed it. In Morocco, a campaign to stop honor killing resulted instead in a ruling that, if anything, endorsed the practice, by extending to women who kill in a fit of sexual jealousy the same protection under law that men had.

Yet there are signs of change. In Lebanon last month, Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, the top Shiite cleric and spiritual leader of Hezbollah, issued a fatwa banning honor killing and describing it as “a repulsive act, condemned and prohibited by religion.” And earlier this year, Egypt’s grand mufti upheld a fatwa stating that Islam permits a woman to have her virginity “refurbished” through hymen surgery, which would allow her to marry and would eliminate the need to cleanse the so-called stain on her family’s honor. He even appeared on national television to advise Egyptian women considering the procedure. Although the ruling has been assailed by conservative scholars, it has been welcomed by those who hope it will prevent future honor killings.

In Syria, activists say that the existence of a case like Zahra’s — which has remained open in part because of the bad blood between Fawaz and Zahra’s family — has proved essential to keeping up momentum in the campaign to change Article 548. The civil suit brought by Fawaz claims that Fayyez conspired to deceive him, and the existence of the civil case means that, under Syrian law, the criminal case is unlikely to be dropped as quickly as similar ones. Fayyez is in custody awaiting trial (no lawyer has been appointed for him yet), and if Zahra’s death is ruled a murder rather than an honor crime, he could go to prison for 12 to 15 years. Activists say that penalty, whether or not Article 548 is struck down, would stand as a powerful warning to other would-be killers in the name of honor. Fawaz and his family are under enormous pressure from their tribe to drop the case. They have been in touch with Zahra’s family members — who, they say, do not deny the crime, nor having celebrated it. Zahra’s family has offered Fawaz money and another daughter to marry, he says, if he will abandon the lawsuit that is now the cause of so much public scrutiny.

“It’s a big scandal now, in the whole neighborhood, the whole community,” Fawaz said. “I can’t even have coffee now with my best friends, because they’re afraid for their sisters.”

But Fawaz told me that he didn’t understand his own feelings about honor killing until Zahra’s death, and that he hoped the publicity surrounding her case would help other men to re-evaluate theirs. “In Zahra’s case, the girl was basically kidnapped,” Fawaz said. “If she’d been a bad girl, if she’d decided to run away with a man, I’d say, maybe. It’s a brutal solution, but maybe.”

His father broke in. “Even then! When a girl does something wrong like that, especially a girl that young, I don’t think that she is responsible. The family is responsible. The father is responsible. I don’t want to give anyone excuses for murder.”

Fawaz nodded. “I start thinking about Zahra lying there, dying, and I don’t think I can believe in that set of values any longer.”

Friday, September 21st, 2007

Sept. 18, 2007 – The doctor knows, just from glancing at the burns, that someone is lying to him. Srood Tawfiq, a reconstructive surgeon at Sulaimaniya Hospital in Iraq’s northern Kurdish region, buttons his white lab coat and steps into the burn unit. “Busy day yesterday,” he says, pulling back a curtain to reveal a sleeping 16-year-old girl with kerosene burns over 90 percent of her body. The mother of the young woman, hovering over the hospital bed, tells Tawfiq that her daughter slipped and scalded herself while carrying a portable stove. The doctor listens sympathetically. But later, out of the woman’s earshot, he explains that he doubts the mother’s explanation. If it were really an accident, he whispers, “you don’t get this degree of burn.” Outside the hospital room he pulls off his hygienic mask and shakes his head. “We never tell them that they’re going to die,” he says quietly.

Kurdistan has long been considered the one consistently safe and relatively prosperous region of Iraq. So why, in increasing numbers, are the territory’s young women showing up at local hospitals dying of suspicious burns? According to the Women’s Union of Kurdistan, there were 95 such cases in the first six months of 2007, up 15 percent since last year. A December 2006 report from the Asuda women’s rights group in Sulaimaniya says that the “phenomenon is increasing at an alarming rate.” Ninety-five percent of the victims are under 30, and roughly half are between 16 and 21. On the day before I stopped by the emergency hospital in Sulaimaniya, six young women were admitted with major burns, three of them telling suspicious stories. When I called Zryan Yones, the Kurdish health minister, he said that the trend among young women is more disturbing than a recent outbreak of cholera. He provided a startling statistic: since August 10, Kurdistan had had nine deaths from its cholera epidemic; in the same period, there were 25 young women dead of burns. “I have one young girl lying in our morgues every single day,” he told me.

So what’s going on? Most of the survivors tell doctors that the burns resulted from a “cooking accident.” But surgeons told me they can tell that the vast majority are not telling the truth. Kerosene, the fuel used to cook here, is not particularly volatile; if a woman comes in with burns over the majority of her body, it is likely intentional. Women’s rights advocates in Sulaimaniya believe that the majority of the burn cases are suicide attempts; the remainder are suspected to be honor killings or other murders disguised as accidents or suicide. (“Cooking accident” has long been a euphemism for dowry killing in India.) Doctors told me that it’s virtually impossible to distinguish between murder and suicide based on the burns and the women’s stories. Still, anecdotal evidence suggests that the trend may be aggravated by a copycat effect among Kurdistan’s teenagers. One 20-year-old woman, Heshw Mohammad, who briefly considered burning herself after her father killed her boyfriend two years ago, told me that self-immolation has become a sort of fashion among teenage Kurdish women. “They imitate each other,” she says.

What’s the motive—and why fire? Doctors, rights advocates, and young women I spoke to described a collision of local tradition with modern technology and the fallout from the Iraq war. Death by immolation has a long history among ethnic Kurds. When someone is angry here, a popular interjection is “I’m going to burn myself!” Locals I talked to attributed the fire obsession to various local cultural sources. The Zoroastrian religion uses fire as a prominent symbol. The Kurdish new year, called “Nawroz,” commemorates the day a folk hero named Kawa killed a tyrant named Zohak and then set a fire on a mountaintop to tell his followers; Kurds celebrate the day by burning tires and with other pyrotechnic displays. “Burning, traditionally, has been the way to die among the Kurdish people,” says Yones, the health minister.

Most of the burn cases in Kurdistan—whether suicides or honor killings—revolve around love and dating. Heshw Mohammad’s case is typical. When she was 18 she fell in love with a local boy, and the two started seeing each other, which is generally frowned on in Kurdistan’s traditional society. They communicated secretly by text message on their mobile phones to arrange meetings. But her father had other ideas about his daughter’s future; he had already promised her to one of his friends. When Heshw’s boyfriend asked her father to let the girl marry him, her father gunned the boy down with an AK-47, she says. She later attempted suicide by overdosing on medication, but she acknowledges that burning herself “crossed my mind.” After the killing, her boyfriend’s father took her to a women’s shelter in Sulaimaniya, where she now says she sleeps late and spends her time watching South Korean soap operas on satellite TV. “I have no plans for the future,” she told me. “I’m quite sure I will be killed in the end.”

Rights advocates explain that the introduction in the past several years of inexpensive mobile phones and e-mail to Kurdistan have made dating and casual sex easier, even as the old patriarchal social structures remain in place. “The explosion of technology has alienated people from themselves,” says Samera Mohammad of the Rassan women’s rights center in Sulaimaniya. She says that a disturbing number of the suicides involve boys who take pictures of their girlfriends with their camera phones and then show their friends. But rights advocates say that even something as simple as bad grades can be a motive for self-immolation.

The Iraq war only made things worse. Refugees from Iraq’s cities, some of whom have turned to prostitution to earn a living, have flocked to Kurdistan from elsewhere in the country, challenging rural sexual mores and the religious beliefs of the mostly Sunni Muslim Kurds. Kurdistan’s lakeside resorts are said to be a popular destination for sex workers in search of easy income. “With the arrival of prostitutes, men have become more suspicious of their daughters,” says Paiman Izzedine of the Women’s Union of Kurdistan. Economic factors have also aggravated the problem, according to locals. The price of kerosene, for example, has tripled since the war began, its price swinging wildly, black-market dealers told me. That means households now stockpile the fuel for the winter in large quantities when they can get it cheap—providing young women with inspiration and an easy weapon.

For now, the suicides are a phenomenon that is seldom discussed openly in Kurdistan. Srood Tawfiq, the surgeon at Sulaimaniya’s burn center, says he has seen only five or six cases in which the patients admitted to a suicide attempt. Rights advocates told me that they’re beginning to hold conferences in local villages to educate teachers and other community leaders about the problem. Yet even Tawfiq acknowledges that he doesn’t press his patients too hard about their real motivations. “We don’t insist on the cause,” he told me, as we talked outside the burn unit. “We just ask once; we don’t push it.” Even in relatively peaceful Kurdistan, sometimes the truth is too merciless to speak.

Jordan launches national project to curb violence against women

Wednesday, September 12th, 2007

Jordan launched a U.S.-funded project Monday to curb violence and other forms of abuse against women under the auspices of the country’s Queen Rania.

Organizers said the campaign was aimed at changing widespread Jordanian misconceptions condoning violence against women, as well as providing services to those experiencing abuse.

A 2002 study, “Jordan Demographic and Health Survey,” found that 87 percent of women here believe their husbands are justified in using physical or verbal abuse.

“I was very surprised by the high percentage,” said Hana Shahin, executive director of the Noor al Hussein Foundation, one of three local organizations spearheading the initiative in conjunction with the U.S. Agency for International Development.

“We began to realize the extent of the problem by speaking with women who came to us for help,” Shahin said. “This led us to set up the first facility in Jordan to help abused women and provide them with counseling services.”

USAID is providing US$1 million (€0.7 million) to the five-year project, which aims to raise public awareness through ad campaigns, train medical and legal advisers to help victims and provide referral services.

Other partners include the National Council for Family Affairs and the Zein al Sharaf Institute for Development, both partially affiliated with the government.

The effort is viewed as further strengthening Jordan’s National Strategic Plan for Family Protection launched by Queen Rania several years ago.

“What’s important now is that we’re moving from theory to action,” said Asma Khader, a former Cabinet minister who heads the Jordanian National Commission for Women.

“The main obstacle is changing people’s perceptions,” she said. “But this is exactly what is needed to confront this practice.”

Khader said there was “an urgent need for public awareness campaigns, services and to strengthen protection methods and legal frameworks.”

Shahin added that her organization would soon start providing counseling services to the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees, particularly children, who have been victimized by violence in their homeland.

Jordan has several other programs in place aimed at protecting women from abuse, including a hot line and a government-run shelter to aid victims.

Women make up roughly half of the population of nearly 6 million people. But decision-making authority is largely held by men in this conservative tribal-based society. An average of 20 women are killed each year by male relatives in so-called “honor crimes,” in which male relatives murder them for simply having a relationship with a male.

Still, many women in Jordan enjoy more freedom than their counterparts in other Arab countries, like Saudi Arabia. They can drive cars, divorce their husbands, hold prominent positions in government and business and can travel abroad without the consent of male relatives.

International Herald Tribune

An ‘honour’ killing a day in Sindh

Friday, September 7th, 2007

Karachi (PPI): On an average over four persons were murdered while a person lost his life daily in so-called honor killings in Sindh during last eight months of current year. A report compiled by Aurat Foundation released Thursday said at least 1136 persons including 284 women, 17 minor girls among them, were murdered in different parts of the province. The data includes 225 persons including 144 women, who were murdered on pretext of Karo-Kari. According to AF report 73 women were injured on pretext of Karo-Kari and four women including minors were raped and murdered; 36 women gang raped, 40 raped and attempts of rape were made on 33 women. The month of May remained very heavy for the people of Sindh because it claimed more than fifty person’s lives including 48 murders on May 12 in Karachi.

According to data collected from citizens action committees (CACs) for women’s rights and media sources at least 89 women committed suicide and 108 others attempted to commit suicide owing to increasing unemployment, forced and under-age marriages, domestic problems, violence, poverty and conflicts. On the other hand, at least 109 women were kidnapped and 34 survived attempts of kidnapping; while 47 women disappeared. Some 137 couples got married through courts after leaving their homes and 109 women sought shelter owing to threats to their lives and dignity.

At least 117 women were arrested by the police under different allegations or in place of their accused male relatives who could not be arrested, while 35 women were physically tortured and some of them lost pregnancies during alleged raids by the police. Ghotki police arrested husband and his wife as they failed to produce a Nikahnama. Both were beaten up and dragged to the Police Station. The report said illegal Jirgas continued to be held in various parts of Sindh despite a ban imposed on this parallel system by the Sukkur Bench of the Sindh High Court. At least 72 Jirgas were held on women-related issues. One woman was declared Garhi (not involved in illicit relations) in a Jirga decision. More than 19 women were murdered by brothers in law on pretext of Karo-Kari or domestic conflicts in Kashmore, Sanghhar, Shikarpur, Larkana, Khanpur, Tangwani, Obaro, Lakhi and Ghhotki.

Justice fails Afghan women

Wednesday, September 5th, 2007

Afghanistan is building new jails for women. Though there are only 300 female prisoners now, that number is expected to grow.

While there are no signs of a crime wave, one of the reasons for the increase is an unlikely one. Lacking in transitional houses for released prisoners, a suggested solution includes using jails as secure places where women can stay until they are reintegrated into society.

By some strange logic, funding for building jails is much easier to come by. But again, half of the women in jail should not be there at all.

Imprisoned for what are loosely described as “moral crimes”, these women would qualify as victims rather than criminals under any interpretation of international human rights laws, including those to which Afghanistan is a signatory. A report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on Afghanistan’s female prisoners and their social reintegration drew attention to their dismal condition in a country where women face acute discrimination.

Not only are an estimated half victims themselves, but they are further victimised by the criminal justice process. And on release from prison, they face victimisation for a third time. This can take the form of, at best, the family leaving the woman to fend for herself, and at worst, a so-called honour killing.

Released in Kabul on Sunday, the UNODC report recommended laws changes, better facilities and improved legal aid to address some of the issues facing female prisoners. These suggestions were debated with representatives of the ministry of justice, the supreme court and other Afghan departments.

Forced marriages

The UN women’s fund (Unifem) found that 80 per cent of the violence perpetrated against women in Afghanistan originated in their homes. According to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), 60 to 80 per cent of marriages in Afghanistan are forced, some of them involving girls as young as six years old.

Subjected to sexual and psychological abuse along with violence in their marital home, many girls run away. And when they come in contact with Afghanistan’s criminal justice system, instead of receiving any protection, they are seen as offenders and convicted.

Opening a seminar organised jointly with the ministry of justice, Christina Orguz, UNODC country office representative, said that many people do not want to talk about the issue of female inmates. Many are “in prison for things that would make them victims not perpetrators”, she said.

Increased awareness

Anou Borrey, a gender and justice consultant with Unifem, said: “There is a need to increase the awareness of women about their rights so they don’t end up in prison”. She said simple measures like registering marriages and the birth of a child could prevent adultery charges and stop child marriages.

“Currently the majority of the female prisoners are being held for violating social, behavioural and religious norms,” UNODC said.

The reason is the lack of a robust formal criminal justice system.

An estimated 80 per cent of all legal cases are dealt with by the traditional justice system, based on customary laws that vary from region to region and tribe to tribe.

Documentation of the customary laws by the International Legal Foundation showed that the laws are at their most discriminatory towards women.

Not only are women penalised disproportionately for crimes, but they are punished on evidentiary standards that discriminate against them. Moreover, some of the customary laws also allow for them to be used as barter for settling other disputes, debts and feuds.

“In the restorative practice of the justice in Afghanistan, women who are regarded as the property of men, are often used as valuable commodities in the settlement of crimes and disputes” UNODC said.

“Rape may be treated as adultery and punished accordingly if a settlement cannot be reached between the two families concerned.”

Unclear definition

Even Afghanistan’s formal justice system does not clearly define rape as a separate crime, including it under the offence of “zina” or adultery, pederasty and violation of honour.

In practice, a woman often has to prove her lack of consent in a rape case in order to avoid being punished for it.

Although there is no distinct penalty for rape, there is a distinction – the so-called honour crimes. Those who commit them are exempt from the charge of murder, the conviction is discretionary and imprisonment is for a maximum of two years.

A 30-year-old woman serving a six year sentence in Pul-e-Charkhi jail became the victim of this clause of the law.

When her husband killed his neighbour during a dispute, he claimed he had been driven to murder by the man committing adultery with his “property”. He received leniency from the court and his wife was jailed for committing adultery.

Mercenary reasons

Several women who were interviewed by UNODC were verbally divorced and had married again, but were later “reported” by their first husbands and jailed. In one case the woman had been in her second marriage for 10 years and had given birth to five children.

The reason is not necessarily malignancy but often mercenary. If a man can prove his “property” has been seized by another, he can claim compensation using the threat of the criminal justice system.

But, as the UNODC report says, being in prison for moral crimes is only part of the problem.

Other women are dealt with outside the formal justice system, a threat that still awaits the prisoners when they step out of jail.

Shukria Noori, the national project co-ordinator for social reintegration of prisoners, says that women may be “threatened, violated and even killed”.

Shelters for women do not have the capacity to absorb the large numbers of victims and are reluctant to accept inmates from prison, she said.

Borrey said there is a lack of support from the government, non-governmental organisations and the community to ensure that the women are reintegrated.

Even if she does not become the victim of a so-called honour crime, a female prisoner’s chance of survival after her release is very low.

Social mores

In a substantial number of cases, her family refuses to take her back. She has few marketable skills and Afghanistan’s social mores make it extremely difficult for a single woman to survive on her own.

“A lot of women in prison are not criminals according to international standards” Dorothea Grieger, a criminal justice programme assistant with UNODC, said.

“But the underlying principles of minimum standard rules apply to them as well. Improvement should be used to help them to lead self-supporting lives after release.”

This is something that UN bodies and women’s organisations like Medica Mondiale are trying to address.

Legal aid as well as literacy, education and vocational training inside the prisons would empower the women prisoners with some marketable skills that could help them survive.

But most important of all perhaps is preparing them for release.

Mediation with the family, local elders or religious leaders enhances the chances of her acceptance. Sudden releases, like during Id al-Fitr, can actually harm the women more, leaving them on the streets.

Al Jazeera

Child Marriage – a Neglected Problem

Saturday, September 1st, 2007

Nioro Du Sahel
Two years ago, in the western Malian village of Korera-Kore, a 13-year-old girl was forced into marriage during her school summer holiday. She died after complications during sex on her wedding night.

This young Malian, whose case was documented by a local organisation called the Coordination of Women’s Associations and Non-governmental organisations (CAFO), is one of more than 60 million women globally who were married or in union before the age of 18, according to estimates by the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF).

Campaigners say forced early marriage, or child marriage, is a problem that has been largely untouched by the international community. In Mali it is considered by the research organisation Population Council as “one of the most severe crises of child marriage in the world today”; the few workers in this field say progress is too slow.

“There hasn’t been a really concerted effort to address the issue [at the international level],” said Naana Otoo-Oyortey, a founding member of the Forum on Marriage and the Rights of Women and Girls, a network of mostly UK-based organisations who campaign against early marriage and violence against women. “It’s been a neglected issue.”

Otoo-Oyortey said unlike female genital mutilation/cutting, which is prohibited in many international conventions, child marriage receives little visibility and little funding from donors for programmes to reduce the practice, despite its link to increased rates of maternal mortality, fistula and HIV/AIDS.

Slow decline

Legal framework

In Mali, a girl is legally allowed to wed at the age of 15 with the consent of her parents. In some cases, girls younger than 15 can wed with the authorisation of a judge.

A government bill that would, among other things, raise the legal age of marriage to 18 has been on the books for five years, but has yet to be passed.

“Now, it’s a question of political will,” said Bakary Traoré, technical adviser on children at the Malian Ministry for the Promotion of Women, Children and Family.

According to Founé Samaké, lawyer and member of the Clinique juridique des femmes maliennes, a legal aid clinic, Malian law punishes the abduction of women for forced marriage by one to five years in prison. When the abducted girl is less than 15 years old, the sentence is up to 10 years of forced labour and, at the discretion of the judge, an injunction banning the convicted person from specified places for up to 20 years.

But enforcing the law is an “arduous task”, Samaké said, because family members are often accomplices in the forced marriage.

In Mali, according to the latest statistics from the 2001 Demographic and Health Survey, 65 percent of women aged 20-24 were married by the age of 18, one of the highest rates in the world. Nationwide, 25 percent of girls were married by the age of 15, and one in 10 married girls aged 15-19 gave birth before age 15.

While this marks a decrease since 1987, when 79 percent of Malian women married as children, advocates say the numbers are not dropping fast enough, largely because not enough people are working on the subject.

“The global trend has been a slow decline,” said Nassra Abass, a consultant in UNICEF’s child protection section in New York. “[But] there’s definitely a lot more that we can do.”

She said UNICEF’s focus has been on reducing female genital cutting (FGC), a movement that has “momentum”, unlike child marriage, honour killings and other traditional practices considered harmful by the UN.

“There have not been very many resources or much time invested in early marriage. There aren’t many programmes running. That’s why the decline is slow,” Abass told IRIN.

Dangers

The mild decline in early marriage in Mali has been attributed to the few education and awareness raising programmes that do exist.

In the western Malian region of Kayes, where 83 percent of girls are married by the age of 18, particular effort has been paid to informing people of the risks of early marriage.

According to the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), girls aged 15-19 are twice as likely to die during pregnancy or childbirth as women aged 20-24. Among girls aged 10-14, the risk is five times greater. Early onset of sexual activity has also been linked to increased risk of HIV/AIDS because child brides are less likely to be educated and more likely to have unprotected sex with older men who have had more sexual partners.

New research by CAFO of Nioro du Sahel, one of Kayes’s largest cities, showed that in Kayes, between 2005 and May 2007, at least 10 girls – many not yet teenagers – lost their lives because of complications after their wedding nights, sometimes due to haemorrhaging after forced intercourse.

Education

As a result, in July, CAFO joined with UNICEF, the government department responsible for the promotion of women, and the union of independent radio and TV stations, to organise the first public awareness campaign in the region of Kayes. It included a three-day workshop with religious and community leaders, informing them of the dangers of early marriage and helping them produce messages against early marriage to be broadcast in the local media. A similar workshop took place in the eastern region of Gao in June.

“We were ignorant. We married girls at 9, 10, 11 or 12 years old. Now, we’ve seen the reality. We will no longer practice this,” Diawara Mamadou, head of the town of Gogui and one of 12 community representatives present at the workshop, told IRIN.

For the last two years, UNICEF has also been working with communities in three regions of Mali – Segou, Mopti and Kayes – to inform residents of the risks, help them abandon the practice, and set up committees that will intervene in cases of early marriage. UNICEF in Mali has set up an internal working group to better coordinate work on early marriage, and hopes to extend these programmes nation-wide.

“[In Mali], we are the only ones interested in this problem,” said Fabienne Dubey, assistant programme officer for education at UNICEF-Mali. “I don’t know of other organisations working on this. It is still very rudimentary.”

UNFPA runs educational programmes focusing on reproductive health that include, but do not specifically target, early marriage. Starting in 2008, UNFPA will make early marriage more of a priority, according to reproductive health programme officer Mariam Cissoko.

What works

“The most important thing that a national government should do is ensure enforcement of its own laws,” said Kathy Selvaggio, senior policy advocate at the Massachusetts-based International Center for Research on Women, an organisation lobbying the US government to spend more of its aid money fighting early marriage.

She said legal enforcement must be combined with programmes that provide alternatives to early marriage by increasing the levels of education and economic opportunities of girls.

“Where you have successes in combating child marriage, [as in India and Ethiopia], they’ve been these comprehensive approaches,” Selvaggio told IRIN.

The Malian government does consider child marriage a form of violence against women, and “there is a whole policy to fight against violence done to women,” according to Kanté Dandara Touré, national director for the promotion of women at the Ministry for the Promotion of Women, Children and Family.

She said the national committee for the fight against detrimental practices does include early marriage in its sensitisation work, using media, community leaders and theatre, but no government program targets early marriage exclusively.

…It’s a question of priorities, and right now female genital cutting is at the top…

“It’s a question of priorities,” and right now “female genital cutting is at the top,” Touré said, noting that more than 90 percent of Malian women are circumcised.

Priorities

Making early marriage a political priority is a necessary first step for change, according to maternal mortality research by Professor Jeremy Shiffman, of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University.

“In Honduras, safe motherhood became one of the country’s foremost health priorities, and between 1990 and 1997, the country experienced a 40 percent decline in its maternal mortality ratio, one of the most significant reductions in such a short time span ever documented in the developing world,” he wrote in a May 2007 article in the American Journal of Public Health.

He found that nine factors shaped the degree to which maternal mortality reduction emerged on the national policy agenda, including efforts by international agencies to establish a global norm concerning its unacceptability; financial and technical resources from international donors; the degree to which national advocates coalesced as a political force; the generation of national attention for the cause; and the existence of competing health causes.

UN Integrated Regional Information Networks